Legal structure, financial structure, and the monetary policy transmission mechanism
Stephen Cecchetti
Economic Policy Review, 1999, vol. 5, issue Jul, 9-28
Abstract:
Among the many challenges facing the new Eurosystem - the European Central Bank and the central banks of the eleven members of the European Monetary Union - is the possibility that participating countries will respond differently to interest rate changes. This paper provides evidence that differences in financial structure are the proximate cause for these national asymmetries in monetary policy transmission and that these differences in financial structure are a result of differences in legal structure. The author concludes that unless legal structures are harmonized across Europe, the financial structures and monetary transmission mechanisms of the European Union countries will remain diverse
Keywords: Monetary policy - Europe; European Monetary System (Organization); Europe; European Central Bank (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Chapter: Legal Structure, Financial Structure and the Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism (2001)
Working Paper: Legal Structure, Financial Structure, and the Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism (1999) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fednep:y:1999:i:jul:p:9-28:n:v.5no.2
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