Executive equity compensation and incentives: a survey

John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay and David F. Larcker

Economic Policy Review, 2003, vol. 9, issue Apr, 27-50

Abstract: Stock and option compensation and the level of managerial equity incentives are aspects of corporate governance that are especially controversial to shareholders, institutional activists, and government regulators. Similar to much of the corporate finance and corporate governance literature, research on stock-based compensation and incentives has not only generated useful insights, but also produced many contradictory findings. Not surprisingly, many fundamental questions remain unanswered. In this study, the authors synthesize the broad literature on equity-based compensation and executive incentives and highlight topics that seem especially appropriate for future research.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Executives; Stockholders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (208)

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