A survey of blockholders and corporate control

Clifford G. Holderness

Economic Policy Review, 2003, vol. 9, issue Apr, 64 pages

Abstract: The author surveys the empirical literature on large-percentage shareholders in public corporations, focusing on four key issues: the prevalence of blockholders; the motivation for block ownership; the effect of blockholders on executive compensation, leverage, the incidence of takeovers, and a wide range of corporate decisions; and the effect of blockholders on firm value. A central finding of this study is that there is little reason for policymakers or small investors to fear large-percentage shareholders in general, especially when the blockholders are active in firm management.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Stockholders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (157)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/03v09n1/0304hold.pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/03v09n1/0304hold.html (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fednep:y:2003:i:apr:p:51-64:n:v.9no.1

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economic Policy Review from Federal Reserve Bank of New York Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Gabriella Bucciarelli ().