Measuring CEO Compensation

Arantxa Jarque and David A. Price

Richmond Fed Economic Brief, 2016, issue Mar

Abstract: Compensation packages for CEOs of large public companies often include grants of restricted stock and stock options, the value of which to the CEO depends on the future performance of the firm, as well as on the terms of the grants. This value, which is key to evaluating the CEO's incentives, can be estimated in a number of ways. The authors use measures based on the expected values and the realized values of pay to compare the compensation of CEOs in a sample of large public U.S. firms and a subset of financial firms before and after the 2007-08 financial crisis.

Date: 2016
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