Preventing Bank Runs

Renee Courtois Haltom and Bruno Sultanum

Richmond Fed Economic Brief, 2018, issue March

Abstract: Banking can be defined as the business of maturity transformation, or "borrowing short to lend long." Economists and policymakers have long viewed banking as inherently unstable, that is, prone to runs. This Economic Brief reviews the intuition and theory behind bank runs and the most popular proposed solutions. It also explores new research suggesting that runs might be prevented by creating a new, low-cost type of deposit contract that eliminates the incentive to run.

Keywords: bank; runs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Preventing bank runs (2017)
Working Paper: Preventing Bank Runs (2014)
Working Paper: Preventing bank runs (2014)
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