Noise Bargaining: A New Perspective on Single Proposers, Negotiation and Delays

Grey Gordon
Additional contact information
Grey Gordon: https://www.richmondfed.org/research/people/gordon

Richmond Fed Economic Brief, 2025, vol. 25, issue 42

Abstract: Many real-world bargaining problems feature a single proposer and delays in reaching agreements. Most existing bargaining models feature alternating proposers with immediate settlement. Noise bargaining — a new approach discussed in my recent working paper, co-authored with Pablo Guerron-Quintana — introduces a single proposer with endogenous delay.

Keywords: production and investment; fiscal policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_brief/2025/eb_25-42 Briefing (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedreb:102096

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Richmond Fed Economic Brief from Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Pascasio ().