Deterring default: why some state laws decrease the probability of mortgage foreclosures

Andra Ghent, Marianna Kudlyak and Stephen Slivinski

Richmond Fed Economic Brief, 2009, issue Sep, No 09-09

Abstract: Many states give mortgage lenders strong legal means by which to pursue debt collection in the event of a mortgage default. In those states, probability of default is lower and the forms the default takes are often quite different from a costly conventional foreclosure.

Keywords: Consumer finance; Financial institutions; Mortgage loans (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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