The Efficient Monitoring Role of Proxy Contests: An Empirical Analysis of Post-Contest Control Changes and Firm Performance

Lisa F. Borstadt and Thomas J. Zwirlein

Financial Management, 1992, vol. 21, issue 3

Abstract: We present an empirical analysis of the subsequent disposition and share price performance of 142 firms involved in proxy contests for board seats in the period 1962-1986. We find evidence that proxy contests increase corporate efficiency through improved monitoring of firms, even in the absence of takeover-related control activity. Our results support the view that proxy contests are an effective managerial disciplinary mechanism in the absence of a takeover.

Date: 1992
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