Infrastructure Development Through Concession and Long-term Investment Contracts

Gregory A. Golyshev ()
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Gregory A. Golyshev: Financial Research Institute, Moscow 127006, Russia

Finansovyj žhurnal — Financial Journal, 2014, issue 1, 101-110

Abstract: Under budgetary constraints in order to facilitate development in economic and social infrastructure it seems crucial to attract private investment, primarily on terms of PPP, where concession and long-term investment contracts play the key role. These models imply quite different plans of compensation for invested capital. This paper describes theoretical and practical aspects of such PPP models, and their financial stability under uncertainty. A number of recommendations for practical implementation are given in order to stimulate the use of public-private partnerships in our country.

Keywords: infrastructure; concession contract; long-term investment contract (LCC); financial scheme; legal regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F21 H54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fru:finjrn:140111:p:101-110

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