Impact of the Antitrust Legislation Interpretation on the Declaration of Firms to be Guilty of Tacit Collusion
Aleksandr V. Kniaginin ()
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Aleksandr V. Kniaginin: Financial Research Institute, Moscow 127006, Russia
Finansovyj žhurnal — Financial Journal, 2018, issue 3, 78-89
The study is devoted to the assessment of the impact of the antitrust laws interpretation on the conviction of tacit collusion. In the first part of the article tacit collusion is explained in terms of game theory and economic theory and then a general approach to proving firms to be guilty of tacit collusion in Russian antitrust legislation is presented. The main part of the work includes analysis of 48 cases content, in which firms of Russian retail fuel market argued in court that they were not guilty of tacit collusion. Based on this analysis, main effects of the antitrust laws interpretation on the conviction of tacit collusion were identified. Author concludes that under certain circumstances the concepts adopted in the Russian legislation make the outcome of the trial depending on the court’s opinion on the interpretation of these concepts and generate a number of unintended systematic effects that may lead to a decrease in public welfare.
Keywords: tacit collusion; antitrust law; fuel market; public welfare; type I and type II errors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fru:finjrn:180306:p:78-89
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