Politico_economic Aspects of Combat with Terrorism

Konstantin Yanovskiy and Sergey Zhavoronkov

Research Paper Series, 2005, issue 82P, 116

Abstract: The paper considers and tests different approaches to analysis of causes of, and incentives to terrorist activities and the media and politicians' opportunist behavior. While the first approach is based on the assumption of a universal deployment of a compromise strategy, the other one is based on the "Tit-or-Tat" classical strategy. Proceeding from the research outcomes, it appears that a policy of compromises and economic aid is an inefficient means to prevent terror which ay even escalate it. The authors do not prescribe the strategy of violent suppression of terrorist activity as a universal and ultimate remedy, but they believe it can preclude the escalation of terror.

Keywords: Terrorism; Combat (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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http://www.iep.ru/files/RePEc/gai/rpaper/117Yanovskiy.pdf Revised version, 2013 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gai:rpaper:117

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