Strategic Interaction Model with Censored Strategies
Nazgul Jenish ()
Additional contact information
Nazgul Jenish: Department of Economics, New York University, 19 West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012, USA
Econometrics, 2015, vol. 3, issue 2, 1-31
In this paper, we develop a new model of a static game of incomplete information with a large number of players. The model has two key distinguishing features. First, the strategies are subject to threshold effects, and can be interpreted as dependent censored random variables. Second, in contrast to most of the existing literature, our inferential theory relies on a large number of players, rather than a large number of independent repetitions of the same game. We establish existence and uniqueness of the pure strategy equilibrium, and prove that the censored equilibrium strategies satisfy a near-epoch dependence property. We then show that the normal maximum likelihood and least squares estimators of this censored model are consistent and asymptotically normal. Our model can be useful in a wide variety of settings, including investment, R&D, labor supply, and social interaction applications.
Keywords: tobit model; static incomplete information games; near-epoch dependent spatial processes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B23 C C00 C01 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jecnmx:v:3:y:2015:i:2:p:412-442:d:50483
Access Statistics for this article
Econometrics is currently edited by Prof. Dr. Kerry Patterson
More articles in Econometrics from MDPI, Open Access Journal
Bibliographic data for series maintained by XML Conversion Team ().