Estimation of Treatment Effects in Repeated Public Goods Experiments

Jianning Kong and Donggyu Sul ()
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Jianning Kong: School of Economics, Shandong University, Shandong 250100, China

Econometrics, 2018, vol. 6, issue 4, 1-24

Abstract: This paper provides a new statistical model for repeated voluntary contribution mechanism games. In a repeated public goods experiment, contributions in the first round are cross-sectionally independent simply because subjects are randomly selected. Meanwhile, contributions to a public account over rounds are serially and cross-sectionally correlated. Furthermore, the cross-sectional average of the contributions across subjects usually decreases over rounds. By considering this non-stationary initial condition—the initial contribution has a different distribution from the rest of the contributions—we model statistically the time varying patterns of the average contribution in repeated public goods experiments and then propose a simple but efficient method to test for treatment effects. The suggested method has good finite sample performance and works well in practice.

Keywords: repeated public goods games; asymptotic treatment effects; trend regression (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B23 C C00 C01 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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