How Do Women Managers Avoid Paying Bribes?

George Clarke

Economies, 2021, vol. 9, issue 1, 1-18

Abstract: Previous studies have found that firms where women have greater influence are less likely to pay bribes than other firms. In this study, we ask how these firms avoid paying bribes. Using data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys, we find that firms run by women avoid meeting and interacting with government officials when they can. Female-managed firms, for example, are less likely to apply for construction and import licenses, less likely to meet with tax officials, and less likely to bid for government contracts than male-managed firms. However, female-managed firms are no less likely to say that officials sought bribes when they met with them than male-managed firms. This suggests the main way that firms with women in positions of power avoid paying bribes is by avoiding situations where officials might seek them.

Keywords: corruption; bribes; firm behavior; enterprise surveys (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E F I J O Q (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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