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Evolutionary Game on Government Regulation and Green Supply Chain Decision-Making

Jiayang Xu (), Jian Cao (), Yunfei Wang (), Xiangrong Shi () and Jiayun Zeng ()
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Jiayang Xu: School of Management, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310023, China
Jian Cao: School of Management, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310023, China
Yunfei Wang: School of Management, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310023, China
Xiangrong Shi: School of Information Management and Engineering, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, Hangzhou 310018, China
Jiayun Zeng: School of Management, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310023, China

Energies, 2020, vol. 13, issue 3, 1-1

Abstract: Sustainability issues have gained growing awareness in recent years. Governments play an important role in environment and resources problems since they can affect enterprises’ production activities by enacting policies and regulations. To promote green production in the long term associated with the consideration of financial intervention of governments, we establish a three-population model of suppliers, manufacturers and governments based on evolutionary game theory, and analyze the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of their unilateral and joint behaviors. Further, system dynamics (SD) is applied to empirical analysis for exploring the dynamic interaction of the populations’ strategy, and the key factors affecting ESS are also discussed in detail. The results show that: (1) the proportion of green suppliers and manufacturers in their groups determines whether the government implements regulation; (2) any party of the supplier and manufacturer that adopts green strategy could promote green behavior of the other; (3) the government is advised to supervise and implement reward and punishment mechanism under the low proportion of green supply chain; (4) government regulation could promote the corporations to adopt green behavior and should preferentially implements the mechanism on manufacturers. The results provide insights into the policy-making of governments and enterprises management on sustainable development.

Keywords: green strategy; government regulation; reward and punishment; evolutionary game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q Q0 Q4 Q40 Q41 Q42 Q43 Q47 Q48 Q49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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