A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Incentive Effects for Agribiomass Power Generation Supply Chain in China

Juanjuan Wu, Jian Zhang, Weiming Yi, Hongzhen Cai, Yang Li and Zhanpeng Su
Additional contact information
Juanjuan Wu: Shandong Research Center of Engineering and Technology for Clean Energy, School of Agricultural Engineering and Food Science, Shandong University of Technology, Zibo 255000, China
Jian Zhang: Shandong Research Center of Engineering and Technology for Clean Energy, School of Agricultural Engineering and Food Science, Shandong University of Technology, Zibo 255000, China
Weiming Yi: Shandong Research Center of Engineering and Technology for Clean Energy, School of Agricultural Engineering and Food Science, Shandong University of Technology, Zibo 255000, China
Hongzhen Cai: Shandong Research Center of Engineering and Technology for Clean Energy, School of Agricultural Engineering and Food Science, Shandong University of Technology, Zibo 255000, China
Yang Li: Shandong Research Center of Engineering and Technology for Clean Energy, School of Agricultural Engineering and Food Science, Shandong University of Technology, Zibo 255000, China
Zhanpeng Su: Shandong Research Center of Engineering and Technology for Clean Energy, School of Agricultural Engineering and Food Science, Shandong University of Technology, Zibo 255000, China

Energies, 2021, vol. 14, issue 3, 1-18

Abstract: The undersupplies of feedstock and high costs have hindered the development of China’s biomass power generation. In this paper, the noncooperative game, farmer–broker cooperative game, and broker–biomass power plant cooperative game, under government incentives, are constructed and analyzed. The optimal decision strategies and profits for these three cases are obtained, while numerical examples and sensitivity analysis are conducted, aiming at illustrating some specific features of the games. It is shown that the government plays a critical role in the development of utilizing agribiomass for power generation and can work better in cooperative games. In addition, both agribiomass supply quantity and profits of supply chain members are higher in cooperative than in noncooperative game. Meanwhile, farmers can get the maximum profit in the broker–biomass power plant cooperative game, while biomass power plant makes the maximum profit in the farmer–broker cooperative game. To guide the healthy development of the industry, there is an urgent need for further exploration of the biomass supply chain management and coordination issue. Specifically, the cooperative game for establishing optimal feedstock price subsidy policy will be done by way of adjusting government incentives and alliance profit distribution.

Keywords: governmental incentive; game-theoretic analysis; agribiomass power generation; supply chain; cooperative game; noncooperative game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q Q0 Q4 Q40 Q41 Q42 Q43 Q47 Q48 Q49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/14/3/546/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/14/3/546/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jeners:v:14:y:2021:i:3:p:546-:d:484742

Access Statistics for this article

Energies is currently edited by Ms. Agatha Cao

More articles in Energies from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().