Optimal Operation for Regional IES Considering the Demand- and Supply-Side Characteristics
Wenying Li,
Ming Tang,
Xinzhen Zhang,
Danhui Gao and
Jian Wang
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Wenying Li: Sichuan Energy Internet Research Institute, Tsinghua University, Chengdu 610042, China
Ming Tang: Sichuan Energy Internet Research Institute, Tsinghua University, Chengdu 610042, China
Xinzhen Zhang: Sichuan Energy Internet Research Institute, Tsinghua University, Chengdu 610042, China
Danhui Gao: Sichuan Energy Internet Research Institute, Tsinghua University, Chengdu 610042, China
Jian Wang: Sichuan Energy Internet Research Institute, Tsinghua University, Chengdu 610042, China
Energies, 2022, vol. 15, issue 4, 1-27
Abstract:
A regional integrated energy system (RIES) is an electricity-centric multi-energy system that can realize the mutual conversion of electricity, heat, cold, and other energy. Through multi-flexible resource interaction and the transaction of multi-investment entities, the efficiency of energy utilization can be improved. To systematize energy-consuming entities and scale photovoltaic-based renewable energy in a distribution network, the energy-consuming behavior, energy-producing schedule, and trading strategy can be coupled. Considering the interaction between the energy-consuming behavior and the uncertainty of distributed photovoltaic output, an optimal operation method for RIES is proposed on the basis of social network theory and an uncertain evolutionary game method in this paper. From the perspective of the operator, the overall profits of RIES are maximized considering the entity characteristics of both the demand and the supply side. A case study shows that the proposed method can ensure the reasonable distribution of profit among the investment entities. A closer social relationship between energy-consuming entities or a lower transaction risk cost of energy-producing entities can increase the overall energy transaction profit.
Keywords: regional integrated energy system; social network theory; uncertain evolutionary game; energy transaction strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q Q0 Q4 Q40 Q41 Q42 Q43 Q47 Q48 Q49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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