Reachability-Based False Data Injection Attacks and Defence Mechanisms for Cyberpower System

Ren Liu, Hussain M. Mustafa, Zhijie Nie and Anurag K. Srivastava
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Ren Liu: State Key Laboratory of HVDC, National Energy Power Grid Technology R&D Centre, Guangdong Provincial Key Laboratory of Intelligent Operation and Control for New Energy Power System, CSG Key Laboratory for Power System Simulation, Electric Power Research Institute, China Southern Power Grid, Guangzhou 510663, China
Hussain M. Mustafa: Department of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV 26506, USA
Zhijie Nie: GE Digital, Bothell, WA 98011, USA
Anurag K. Srivastava: Department of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV 26506, USA

Energies, 2022, vol. 15, issue 5, 1-18

Abstract: With the push for higher efficiency and reliability, an increasing number of intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) and associated information and communication technology (ICT) are integrated into the Internet of Things (IoT)-enabled smart grid. These advanced technologies and IEDs also bring potential vulnerabilities to the intelligent cyber–physical smart grid. State estimation, as a primary step of system monitoring and situational awareness, is a potential target for attackers. A number of other smart grid applications, such as voltage stability assessment and contingency screening, utilize state estimation results as input data. False data injection (FDI) is a specific way to attack state estimation by manipulating input data. Existing research mainly focuses on the mathematical analysis of FDI attacks; however, in these methods, discussions of reachability requirements to compromise measurements considering cyberinfrastructure are limited. Reachability is defined as a measure that estimates the number of hosts to compromise for the possible FDI. Most of the existing FDI attack methods require the simultaneous manipulation on multiple measurement devices in different substations, in order to bypass the bad data detection, which may be impractical. In this paper, a new type of reachability-based FDI attack considering the cybernetwork with a practical attack is proposed and validated on two IEEE test systems. The corresponding defence mechanisms are (a) decentralized state estimation (DSE), (b) DSE with additional backup computational nodes, (c) communication network rerouting, and (d) intrusion detection system, and they were developed and presented with validation for two IEEE test systems with superior performance for an IoT-enabled intelligent smart grid system.

Keywords: state estimation; cyber–physical analysis; false data injection attacks; smart grid communication; smart grid measurements; IoT (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q Q0 Q4 Q40 Q41 Q42 Q43 Q47 Q48 Q49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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