Cooperative Game Cooperative Control Strategy for Electric Vehicles Based on Tariff Leverage

Feng Zhou, Weizhen Shi, Xiaomei Li, Chao Yang and Ting Hao ()
Additional contact information
Feng Zhou: College of Electrical Engineering and Automation, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, China
Weizhen Shi: College of Electrical Engineering and Automation, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, China
Xiaomei Li: State Grid Shandong Electric Power Company, Qingdao Power Supply Company, Qingdao 266000, China
Chao Yang: State Grid Shandong Electric Power Company, Qingdao Power Supply Company, Qingdao 266000, China
Ting Hao: College of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, China

Energies, 2023, vol. 16, issue 12, 1-20

Abstract: To address the negative impact of large-scale disorderly grid connection of EVs on the stable operation of the power grid, a cooperative game cooperative control strategy for EVs based on tariff leverage is proposed, taking the grid-side and user-side economy as the objective function, taking into account the EV load state constraint, distribution grid power constraint, bi-directional charging and discharging pile power constraint, dynamic tariff constraint, and cooperative game members’ revenue constraint. A dynamic cooperative game model based on bi-directional charging and discharging piles is established, and the weight of users in the game is increased. Based on the cooperative game model, an optimal real-time tariff is determined for both the electric power operators and the charging and discharging pile users and based on the real-time updated dynamic tariff and the EV power connected to the charging and discharging pile at the current moment, a genetic algorithm is used to solve the simulation based on the Receding Horizon Control principle. The simulation results show that this control strategy has a smoother load curve and better peak and valley reduction than the fixed tariff and the time-of-use tariff, and it reduces the operating cost of the electric power operators. In addition, it brings the best economic benefits to the users, with the overall revenue of the charging and discharging piles increasing by up to 6.3% under the dynamic tariff.

Keywords: bi-directional charging and discharging piles; cooperative control; cooperative game; tariff leverage; dynamic tariff; peak shaving and valley filling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q Q0 Q4 Q40 Q41 Q42 Q43 Q47 Q48 Q49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/16/12/4808/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/16/12/4808/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jeners:v:16:y:2023:i:12:p:4808-:d:1174778

Access Statistics for this article

Energies is currently edited by Ms. Agatha Cao

More articles in Energies from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().