A Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Smart Grid Data Sharing Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Lihua Zhang (), Qingyu Lu, Rui Huang, Shihong Chen, Qianqian Yang and Jinguang Gu
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Lihua Zhang: School of Software, East China Jiaotong University, Nanchang 330013, China
Qingyu Lu: School of Software, East China Jiaotong University, Nanchang 330013, China
Rui Huang: School of Electrical and Automation Engineering, East China Jiaotong University, Nanchang 330013, China
Shihong Chen: School of Electrical and Automation Engineering, East China Jiaotong University, Nanchang 330013, China
Qianqian Yang: School of Software, East China Jiaotong University, Nanchang 330013, China
Jinguang Gu: College of Computer Science and Technology, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430065, China

Energies, 2023, vol. 16, issue 24, 1-22

Abstract: With the increasing popularization and application of the smart grid, the harm of the data silo issue in the smart grid is more and more prominent. Therefore, it is especially critical to promote data interoperability and sharing in the smart grid. Existing data-sharing schemes generally lack effective incentive mechanisms, and data holders are reluctant to share data due to privacy and security issues. Because of the above issues, a dynamic incentive mechanism for smart grid data sharing based on evolutionary game theory is proposed. Firstly, several basic assumptions about the evolutionary game model are given, and the evolutionary game payoff matrix is established. Then, we analyze the stabilization strategy of the evolutionary game based on the payoff matrix, and propose a dynamic incentive mechanism for smart grid data sharing based on evolutionary game theory according to the analysis results, aiming to encourage user participation in data sharing. We further write the above evolutionary game model into a smart contract that can be invoked by the two parties involved in data sharing. Finally, several factors affecting the sharing of data between two users are simulated, and the impact of different factors on the evolutionary stabilization strategy is discussed. The simulation results verify the positive or negative incentives of these parameters in the data-sharing game process, and several factors influencing the users’ data sharing are specifically analyzed. This dynamic incentive mechanism scheme for smart grid data sharing based on evolutionary game theory provides new insights into effective incentives for current smart grid data sharing.

Keywords: evolutionary game theory; smart grid; smart contract; data sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q Q0 Q4 Q40 Q41 Q42 Q43 Q47 Q48 Q49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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