Enhancing the Carbon Reduction Potential in Ridesplitting through Evolutionary Game Strategies of Tripartite Stakeholders under Carbon-Inclusive Policy

Zheyin Jin, Ye Li, Dominique Gruyer and Meiting Tu ()
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Zheyin Jin: The Key Laboratory of Road and Traffic Engineering, Ministry of Education, College of Transportation Engineering, Tongji University, 4800 Cao’an Road, Shanghai 201804, China
Ye Li: The Key Laboratory of Road and Traffic Engineering, Ministry of Education, College of Transportation Engineering, Tongji University, 4800 Cao’an Road, Shanghai 201804, China
Dominique Gruyer: Laboratory on Perception, Interactions, Behaviors, and Simulation of the Road and Street Users (PICS-L), COSYS Department, University Gustave Eiffel—IFSTTAR, 25 allée des Marronniers, building IFSTTAR—UGE, 2nd floor, office 52, 78000 Versailles, France
Meiting Tu: The Key Laboratory of Road and Traffic Engineering, Ministry of Education, College of Transportation Engineering, Tongji University, 4800 Cao’an Road, Shanghai 201804, China

Energies, 2024, vol. 17, issue 16, 1-21

Abstract: The advancement of emission reduction benefits in ridesplitting relies on a comprehensive carbon reduction incentive policy initiated by the government and implemented through the collaborative efforts of multiple stakeholders. The aim of this study is to understand the implementation mechanism and explore the carbon reduction potential of the Carbon-Inclusive Policy. A framework has been developed to explore an evolutionary stabilization strategy through a three-party evolutionary game model, which considers the crucial stakeholders of the government, shared mobility companies, and travelers. A comprehensive sensitivity analysis has been conducted across various scenarios on key factors to ensure the robustness and accuracy of findings. The study’s primary findings indicate that the government’s level of commitment to the Carbon-Inclusive Policy significantly influences strategic decisions and the pace of evolution among the three stakeholders in the evolutionary game. Companies critically assess the economic viability of ridesplitting, particularly in light of development costs and subsidy incentives. Government backing and increased ridesplitting adoption by travelers serve to mitigate risks, incentivizing companies to actively promote ridesplitting. Furthermore, the study emphasizes the necessity of balancing individual, company, and societal interests for sustainable transportation development, advocating for reasonable carbon tax credits and the promotion of novel development concepts such as Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) principles. These findings serve as a significant resource for policymakers navigating the complexities of integrating carbon considerations into transportation policy frameworks, contributing to a deeper theoretical understanding of Carbon-Inclusive Policy implementation in the sector.

Keywords: Carbon-Inclusive policy; ridesplitting; evolution game; travel behavior; urban sustainability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q Q0 Q4 Q40 Q41 Q42 Q43 Q47 Q48 Q49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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