A Master–Slave Game Model of Electric Vehicle Participation in Electricity Markets under Multiple Incentives

Linru Jiang, Chenjie Yan, Chaorui Zhang (), Weiqi Wang, Biyu Wang and Taoyong Li
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Linru Jiang: Laboratory of China Electric Power Research Institute Co., Beijing 100192, China
Chenjie Yan: Laboratory of China Electric Power Research Institute Co., Beijing 100192, China
Chaorui Zhang: School of Electrical Engineering, Northeast Electric Power University, Jilin 132012, China
Weiqi Wang: School of Electrical Engineering, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, China
Biyu Wang: Laboratory of China Electric Power Research Institute Co., Beijing 100192, China
Taoyong Li: Laboratory of China Electric Power Research Institute Co., Beijing 100192, China

Energies, 2024, vol. 17, issue 17, 1-17

Abstract: In order to achieve low carbon emissions in the power grid, the impact of new energy grid connections on the power grid should be reduced, as well as the peak-to-valley load difference caused by large-scale electric vehicle grid connections. This paper proposes a two-tier, low-carbon optimal dispatch master–slave game model involving virtual power plant operators as well as electric vehicle operators. Firstly, the carbon flow is tracked based on the proportional sharing principle, and the carbon emission factor during the charging and discharging process of electric vehicles is calculated. Secondly, the node carbon potential and time-sharing tariff are used to guide and change the charging behaviour of electric vehicles and to construct a master–slave game model for low-carbon optimal scheduling with the participation of multiple subjects, with economic scheduling at the upper level of the model and demand response scheduling at the lower level. Finally, the IEEE30 node system is used as an example to verify that the method adopted in this paper can effectively reduce the peak-to-valley difference of loads, reduce the carbon emissions of the grid, and reduce the cost of each participating entity.

Keywords: carbon emission flow; EV; master–slave game; carbon quota; two-layer optimization scheduling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q Q0 Q4 Q40 Q41 Q42 Q43 Q47 Q48 Q49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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