Study on a Hierarchical Game-Based Model for Generation Rights Trading in Multi-Park CCHP-Based Integrated Energy Systems Accounting for New Energy Grid Integration

Boyang Qu () and Zhaojun Meng
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Boyang Qu: School of Electrical and Automation Engineering, Liaoning Institute of Science and Technology, Benxi 117004, China
Zhaojun Meng: School of Electrical and Automation Engineering, Liaoning Institute of Science and Technology, Benxi 117004, China

Energies, 2025, vol. 18, issue 16, 1-24

Abstract: To address the challenges of power generation rights trading and profit distribution in the integrated energy system of multi-park combined cooling, heating, and power (CCHP) with new energy grid integration, we constructed a hierarchical game model involving multi-energy system aggregators. By having aggregators price electricity, heat, cold, and carbon costs, the model establishes a hierarchical game framework with the linkage of the four prices (electricity, heat, cold, and carbon), achieving inter-park peer-to-peer (P2P) multi-energy dynamic price matching for the first time. It aims to coordinate distribution network dispatching, renewable energy, energy storage, gas turbine units, demand response, cooling–heating–power coupling, and inter-park P2P multi-energy interaction. With the goal of optimizing the profits of integrated energy aggregators, a hierarchical game mechanism is established, which integrates power generation rights trading models and incentive-based demand response. The upper layer of this mechanism is the profit function of integrated energy aggregators, while the lower layer is the cost function of park microgrid alliances. A hierarchical game mechanism with Two-Level Optimization, integrating the Adaptive Disturbance Quantum Particle Swarm Optimization (ADQPSO) algorithm and the branch and bound method (ADQPSO-Driven Branch and Bound Two-Level Optimization), is used to determine dynamic prices, thereby realizing dynamic matching of energy supply and demand and cross-park collaborative optimal allocation. Under the hierarchical game mechanism, the convergence speed of the ADQPSO-driven branch and bound method is 40% faster than that of traditional methods, and the optimization profit accuracy is improved by 1.59%. Moreover, compared with a single mechanism, the hierarchical game mechanism (Scenario 4) increases profits by 17.17%. This study provides technical support for the efficient operation of new energy grid integration and the achievement of “dual-carbon” goals.

Keywords: hierarchical game; CCHP; generation rights trading; ADQPSO; branch and bound; cross-parks collaboration; new energy grid integration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q Q0 Q4 Q40 Q41 Q42 Q43 Q47 Q48 Q49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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