Equilibrium Analysis of Electricity Market with Multi-Agents Considering Uncertainty

Zhonghai Sun, Runyi Pi, Junjie Yang (), Chao Yang and Xin Chen
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Zhonghai Sun: School of Automation, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou 510006, China
Runyi Pi: School of Materials and Energy, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou 510006, China
Junjie Yang: School of Automation, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou 510006, China
Chao Yang: School of Automation, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou 510006, China
Xin Chen: School of Automation, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou 510006, China

Energies, 2025, vol. 18, issue 8, 1-20

Abstract: The engagement of emerging market participants in electricity markets exerts dual influences on price formation mechanisms and operational dynamics. To quantify the impacts on locational marginal prices and stakeholders’ economic interests when EV aggregators (EVAs), cloud energy storage operators (CESSOs), and load aggregators (LAs) collectively participate in market competition, this study develops a bi-level game-theoretic framework for market equilibrium analysis. The proposed architecture comprises two interdependent layers: The upper-layer Stackelberg game coordinates strategic interactions among EVA, LA, and CESSO to mitigate bidding uncertainties through cooperative mechanisms. The lower-layer non-cooperative Nash game models competition patterns to determine market equilibria under multi-agent participation. A hybrid solution methodology integrating nonlinear complementarity formulations with genetic algorithm-based optimization was developed. Extensive numerical case studies validate the methodological efficacy, demonstrating improvements in solution optimality and computational efficiency compared to conventional approaches.

Keywords: electric vehicle aggregator; cloud energy storage system operator; load aggregator; scene reduction method; electricity market equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q Q0 Q4 Q40 Q41 Q42 Q43 Q47 Q48 Q49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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