Multi-Party Energy Management for Clusters of Roof Leased PV Prosumers: A Game Theoretical Approach

Nian Liu, Cheng Wang, Xinhao Lin and Jinyong Lei
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Nian Liu: State Key Laboratory of Alternate Electrical Power System with Renewable Energy Sources, North China Electric Power University, Changping District, Beijing 102206, China
Cheng Wang: State Key Laboratory of Alternate Electrical Power System with Renewable Energy Sources, North China Electric Power University, Changping District, Beijing 102206, China
Xinhao Lin: State Key Laboratory of Alternate Electrical Power System with Renewable Energy Sources, North China Electric Power University, Changping District, Beijing 102206, China
Jinyong Lei: Electrical Power Research Institute, China Southern Power Grid (CSG), Guangzhou 510080, China

Energies, 2016, vol. 9, issue 7, 1-17

Abstract: The roof-leased business mode is an important development method for the distributed photovoltaic (PV) systems. In this paper, the benefits of the PV energy are considered in a PV cluster (PVC) consisting of a certain number of prosumers and a PVC operator (PVCO). In order to distribute the benefits, a multi-party energy management method for the PVC is proposed, including an internal pricing model and a demand response (DR) model. First, the dynamic internal pricing model for the trading between PVCO and prosumers is formulated according to the economic principle of demand and supply relation. Moreover, in order to improve the local consumption of PV energy, the DR model is formulated as a non-cooperative game among the prosumers. Meanwhile, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) are proved, and a distributed solving algorithm is introduced to approach the NE solution. Finally, the PVC including four prosumers is selected as the study object, the results have shown that the internal pricing model and DR model can improve the benefit of both prosumers and PVCO, as well as the local consumption of PV energy.

Keywords: photovoltaic cluster; dynamic price; demand response; non-cooperative game; Nash Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q Q0 Q4 Q40 Q41 Q42 Q43 Q47 Q48 Q49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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