A Three-Party Evolutionary Game Model and Stability Analysis for Network Defense Strategy Selection

Zhenghao Qian, Fengzheng Liu (), Mingdong He, Bo Li, Xuewu Li, Chuangye Zhao, Gehua Fu and Yifan Hu
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Zhenghao Qian: Information Center, Guangdong Power Grid Co., Ltd., Guangzhou 510699, China
Fengzheng Liu: Information Center, Guangdong Power Grid Co., Ltd., Guangzhou 510699, China
Mingdong He: Information Center, Guangdong Power Grid Co., Ltd., Guangzhou 510699, China
Bo Li: Information Center, Guangdong Power Grid Co., Ltd., Guangzhou 510699, China
Xuewu Li: Information Center, Guangdong Power Grid Co., Ltd., Guangzhou 510699, China
Chuangye Zhao: Information Center, Guangdong Power Grid Co., Ltd., Guangzhou 510699, China
Gehua Fu: Information Center, Guangdong Power Grid Co., Ltd., Guangzhou 510699, China
Yifan Hu: Information Center, Guangdong Power Grid Co., Ltd., Guangzhou 510699, China

Future Internet, 2025, vol. 17, issue 11, 1-22

Abstract: Traditional cyber attack-defense strategies have traditionally focused solely on the attacker and defender, while neglecting the role of government-led system administrators. To address strategic selection challenges in cyber warfare, this study employs an evolutionary game theory framework to construct a tripartite game model involving cyber attackers, defenders, and system administrators. The replicator dynamic equation is utilized for stability analysis of behavioral strategies across stakeholders, with Lyapunov theory applied to evaluate the equilibrium points of pure strategies within the system. MATLAB (2021a) simulations were conducted to validate theoretical findings. Experimental results demonstrate that the model achieves evolutionary stability under various scenarios, yielding optimal defense strategies that provide theoretical support for addressing cybersecurity challenges.

Keywords: three-party evolutionary game; network security; network attack; network defense strategy selection; Matlab simulation analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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