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Linkage Based on the Kandori Norm Successfully Sustains Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

Misato Inaba () and Nobuyuki Takahashi ()
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Misato Inaba: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, 5-3-1 Kojimachi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 102-0083, Japan
Nobuyuki Takahashi: Department of Behavioral Science, Graduate School of Letters, Hokkaido University, N.10, W.7, Kita-ku, Sapporo, Hokkaido 060-0810, Japan

Games, 2019, vol. 10, issue 1, 1-15

Abstract: Since social dilemmas among n-persons are often embedded in other types of social exchanges, the exclusion of defectors in social dilemmas from other exchanges functions as a costless selective incentive. Recently, such “linkage” has been considered as a promising solution to resolve the social dilemma problem. However, previous research showed that cooperation sustained by linkage is fragile when subjective perception errors exist. The purpose of this study is to find linkage strategies that are robust against subjective perception errors. Based on the strategies presented in previous studies on indirect reciprocity, we devised several linkage strategies and examined their evolutionary stability by agent-based simulation. The simulation results showed that the linkage strategy based on kandori was evolutionarily stable even when perception errors existed. Our study provides substantial support for the argument that linkage is a plausible solution to the social dilemma problem.

Keywords: linked game; social dilemma; public goods game; indirect reciprocity; agent-based simulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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