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Agency Equilibrium

Jonathan Newton ()
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Jonathan Newton: Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan

Games, 2019, vol. 10, issue 1, 1-15

Abstract: Agency may be exercised by different entities (e.g., individuals, firms, households). A given individual can form part of multiple agents (e.g., he may belong to a firm and a household). The set of agents that act in a given situation might not be common knowledge. We adapt the standard model of incomplete information to model such situations.

Keywords: agency; equilibrium; individualism; collectivism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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