On Adaptive Heuristics that Converge to Correlated Equilibrium

Ayan Bhattacharya
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Ayan Bhattacharya: Bert W. Wasserman Department of Economics and Finance, Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, The City University of New York, New York, NY 10010, USA

Games, 2019, vol. 10, issue 1, 1-11

Abstract: I study the path properties of adaptive heuristics that mimic the natural dynamics of play in a game and converge to the set of correlated equilibria. Despite their apparent differences, I show that these heuristics have an abstract representation as a sequence of probability distributions that satisfy a number of common properties. These properties arise due to the topological structure of the set of correlated equilibria. The characterizations that I obtain have useful applications in the study of the convergence of the heuristics.

Keywords: adaptive heuristics; correlated equilibrium; convergence; repeated games; algorithmic play (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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