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Example of a Finite Game with No Berge Equilibria at All

Jarosław Pykacz, Paweł Bytner and Piotr Frąckiewicz
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Jarosław Pykacz: Institute of Mathematics, Faculty of Mathematics, Physics, and Informatics, University of Gdańsk, 80-308 Gdańsk, Poland
Paweł Bytner: Institute of Mathematics, Faculty of Mathematics, Physics, and Informatics, University of Gdańsk, 80-308 Gdańsk, Poland
Piotr Frąckiewicz: Institute of Mathematics, Pomeranian University, 76-200 Słupsk, Poland

Games, 2019, vol. 10, issue 1, 1-4

Abstract: The problem of the existence of Berge equilibria in the sense of Zhukovskii in normal-form finite games in pure and in mixed strategies is studied. The example of a three-player game that has Berge equilibrium neither in pure, nor in mixed strategies is given.

Keywords: Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii; finite normal-form game; best support to strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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