The Power of Requests in a Redistribution Game: An Experimental Study
Rosemarie Nagel () and
Marc Le Menestrel
Additional contact information
Riccardo Pedersini: ITCS Abba Ballini, via Tirandi 3, 25128 Brescia, Italy
Rosemarie Nagel: Institució Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avançats (ICREA), Passeig de Lluís Companys, 23, 08010 Barcelona, Spain
Marc Le Menestrel: Department of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain
Games, 2019, vol. 10, issue 3, 1-18
In most situations of voluntary contribution people are willing to give at the beginning, however contribution rates decay over time. In a new setup we introduce non-enforceable sharing rules, as requests, in a repeated redistribution game (called tip pooling). Three experimental treatments differ by the requested amount of sharing of privately known random endowments (tips), with one player never receiving any endowment. Using a hurdle model, we find no significant difference in free riding between the three sharing rules, but strong differences in positive contributions which, however, are lower than the rules prescribe. Furthermore, the average positive contribution remains stable over time, while free riding tends to increase.
Keywords: redistribution; ethics; deontological values; social norms; non-enforceable rule; equity; tip pooling; hurdle model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jgames:v:10:y:2019:i:3:p:27-:d:244766
Access Statistics for this article
Games is currently edited by Prof. Dr. Ulrich Berger
More articles in Games from MDPI, Open Access Journal
Bibliographic data for series maintained by XML Conversion Team ().