Electoral Competition with Strategic Disclosure
Jacopo Bizzotto () and
Benjamin Solow ()
Games, 2019, vol. 10, issue 3, 1-17
Recent developments in information and communication technologies allow candidates for office to engage in sophisticated messaging strategies to influence voter choice. We consider how access to different technologies influence the choice of policy platforms by candidates. We find that when candidates can target messages to specific voter groups, platforms are more likely to be inefficient. In particular, when candidates can run targeted campaigns, they commit to projects that benefit small groups even when the social cost of these projects outweigh their benefits. Our results are robust to negative advertising.
Keywords: electoral competition; multidimensional policy space; microtargeting; office-motivated candidates; negative campaigning; strategic disclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jgames:v:10:y:2019:i:3:p:29-:d:246284
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