Stable International Environmental Agreements: Large Coalitions that Achieve Little

Michael Rauscher
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Michael Rauscher: Department of Economics, Universität Rostock, Ulmenstr. 69, 18057 Rostock, Germany

Games, 2019, vol. 10, issue 4, 1-7

Abstract: A standard result of coalition formation games is that stable coalitions are very small if the coalition plays Nash vis-à-vis the rest of the world and if abatement costs are quadratic. It has been shown that larger coalitions and even the grand coalition are possible if the marginal abatement cost is concave. The paper confirms this result, but shows that abatement activities by large coalitions smaller than the grand coalition can be very small. This can be ‘repaired’ only by assuming that the marginal abatement cost curve changes its curvature extremely once the stable coalition has been reached.

Keywords: international environmental agreements; coalition theory; climate change (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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