Subjective Homophily and the Fixtures Problem

Joseph E. Duggan
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Joseph E. Duggan: Department of Economics and Finance, University of Dayton, 300 College Park, Dayton, OH 45469-2251, USA

Games, 2020, vol. 11, issue 1, 1-13

Abstract: The Stable Fixtures problem (Irving and Scott (2007)) is a generalized matching model that nests the well-known Stable Roommates, Stable Marriage, and College Admissions problems as special cases. This paper extends a result of the Stable Roommates problem to demonstrate that a class of homophilic preferences with an appealing psychological interpretation is sufficient to ensure that starting from an arbitrary matching, a decentralized process of allowing the sequential matching of randomly chosen blocking pairs will converge to a pairwise-stable matching with probability one. Strategic implications of this class of preferences are examined and further possible generalizations and directions for future research are discussed.

Keywords: many-to-many matching; stability; stable fixtures problem; homophilic preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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