Hybrid Assessment Scheme Based on the Stern- Judging Rule for Maintaining Cooperation under Indirect Reciprocity

Isamu Okada, Hitoshi Yamamoto and Satoshi Uchida
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Isamu Okada: Faculty of Business Administration, Soka University, Tangi 1-236, Hachioji City, Tokyo 192-8577, Japan
Hitoshi Yamamoto: Department of Information Systems and Operations, Vienna University of Economics, 1020 Wien, Austria
Satoshi Uchida: Research Center for Ethi-Culture Studies, RINRI Institute, Chiyoda City, Tokyo 102-8561, Japan

Games, 2020, vol. 11, issue 1, 1-10

Abstract: Intensive studies on indirect reciprocity have explored rational assessment rules for maintaining cooperation and several have demonstrated the effects of the stern-judging rule. Uchida and Sasaki demonstrated that the stern-judging rule is not suitable for maintaining cooperative regimes in private assessment conditions while a public assessment system has been assumed in most studies. Although both assessment systems are oversimplified and society is most accurately represented by a mixture of these systems, little analysis has been reported on their mixture. Here, we investigated how much weight on the use of information originating from a public source is needed to maintain cooperative regimes for players adopting the stern-judging rule when players get information from both public and private sources. We did this by considering a hybrid-assessment scheme in which players use both assessment systems and by using evolutionary game theory. We calculated replicator equations using the expected payoffs of three strategies: unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection, and stern-judging rule adoption. Our analysis shows that the use of the rule helps to maintain cooperation if reputation information from a unique public notice board is used with more than a threshold probability. This hybrid-assessment scheme can be applied to other rules, including the simple-standing rule and the staying rule.

Keywords: evolution of cooperation; evolutionary game; private assessment; social dilemma; indirect reciprocity; reputation; image score; Kandori norm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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