Public Information: Relevance or Salience?

Giovanna M. Invernizzi
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Giovanna M. Invernizzi: Political Science Department, Columbia University, 420 W 118th St., New York, NY 10027, USA

Games, 2020, vol. 11, issue 1, 1-28

Abstract: How does salient public information affect voters’ behavior? In a majoritarian voting game with common preferences, rational voters could use public information as an information device (depending on accuracy) or as a coordination device (regardless of accuracy). A simple lab experiment contradicts both hypotheses – subjects tend to follow public information when it is salient, regardless of the information’s accuracy, but fail to use it as a source of coordination. In particular, it matters whether the information is recent – subjects are more likely to follow public information when it is provided closer to the voting decision. These findings are important because the salience of public information is easily manipulable by political actors.

Keywords: information aggregation; committee decision making; voting experiment; recency bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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