Information Disclosure through Technology Licensing

Arijit Mukherjee and Aniruddha Bagchi
Additional contact information
Aniruddha Bagchi: Department of Economics, Finance, and Quantitative Analysis, Kennesaw State University, 1000 Chastain Rd NW, Kennesaw, GA 30144, USA

Games, 2020, vol. 11, issue 3, 1-8

Abstract: We show that even if information transmission through an honest outside agency is not possible due to the possibility of collusion between the firms and the outside agency, information transmission is still possible through technology licensing. However, unlike the case of a cost-free honest outside agency, where information transmission always occurs under a quantity setting oligopoly, information transmission through licensing does not always occur.

Keywords: asymmetric information; information transmission; licensing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/11/3/37/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/11/3/37/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jgames:v:11:y:2020:i:3:p:37-:d:408868

Access Statistics for this article

Games is currently edited by Ms. Susie Huang

More articles in Games from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().