A Generalization of Quantal Response Equilibrium via Perturbed Utility

Roy Allen and John Rehbeck
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John Rehbeck: Department of Economics, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210, USA

Games, 2021, vol. 12, issue 1, 1-16

Abstract: We present a tractable generalization of quantal response equilibrium via non-expected utility preferences. In particular, we introduce concave perturbed utility games in which an individual has strategy-specific utility indices that depend on the outcome of the game and an additively separable preference to randomize. The preference to randomize can be viewed as a reduced form of limited attention. Using concave perturbed utility games, we show how to enrich models based on logit best response that are common from quantal response equilibrium. First, the desire to randomize can depend on opponents’ strategies. Second, we show how to derive a nested logit best response function. Lastly, we present tractable quadratic perturbed utility games that allow complementarity.

Keywords: quantal response equilibrium; non-expected utility; limited attention (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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