Imitation and Local Interactions: Long Run Equilibrium Selection

Eugenio Vicario

Games, 2021, vol. 12, issue 2, 1-19

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the long run dynamics of a multi-agent game played on a one-dimensional lattice with periodic boundary conditions, i.e., a ring. Agents repeatedly play a 2 × 2 coordination game with neighbors where the payoff dominant action and the risk dominant action are distinct. Necessary and sufficient conditions for both the actions to be the unique long run equilibrium are provided. The result is obtained through the application of the radius and modified coradius technique.

Keywords: local interactions; coordination games; learning; mutations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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