Stability and Median Rationalizability for Aggregate Matchings

Federico Echenique, SangMok Lee, Matthew Shum and M. Bumin Yenmez
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SangMok Lee: Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO 63130, USA
Matthew Shum: Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA

Games, 2021, vol. 12, issue 2, 1-15

Abstract: We develop the theory of stability for aggregate matchings used in empirical studies and establish fundamental properties of stable matchings including the result that the set of stable matchings is a non-empty, complete, and distributive lattice. Aggregate matchings are relevant as matching data in revealed preference theory. We present a result on rationalizing a matching data as the median stable matching.

Keywords: aggregate matching; median stable matching; rationalizability; lattice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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