Quantile Stable Mechanisms

Peter Chen, Michael Egesdal, Marek Pycia and M. Bumin Yenmez
Additional contact information
Peter Chen: Analysis Group, Chicago, IL 60601, USA
Michael Egesdal: Airbnb, Oakland, CA 94611, USA

Games, 2021, vol. 12, issue 2, 1-9

Abstract: We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms—quantile stable mechanisms—that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the existence of such mechanisms and that all such mechanisms are distinct. We also analyze the manipulability of these mechanisms by market participants.

Keywords: matching; contracts; auctions; mechanisms; incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/12/2/43/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/12/2/43/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jgames:v:12:y:2021:i:2:p:43-:d:556189

Access Statistics for this article

Games is currently edited by Ms. Susie Huang

More articles in Games from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager (indexing@mdpi.com).