Green Innovation and Competition: R&D Incentives in a Circular Economy

Giovanna Bimonte, Maria Romano and Maria Russolillo
Additional contact information
Giovanna Bimonte: Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Salerno, Via Giovanni Paolo II, 132, I-84084 Fisciano, Italy
Maria Russolillo: Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Salerno, Via Giovanni Paolo II, 132, I-84084 Fisciano, Italy

Games, 2021, vol. 12, issue 3, 1-14

Abstract: The present paper provides theoretical insights regarding the determinants of firms’ incentives to invest in a Circular Economy. The analysis relies on a Cournot model disaggregating the disposal cost in the production function. In a non-simultaneous sequential game, two risk-neutral firms are endowed with a green innovation project that, if successful, would reduce the overall production costs and implement a Circular Economy. Firms are plagued by asymmetric information about the exact value of the other firm’s innovation. In this setting, the R&D investment in a Circular Economy, by affecting the distribution of production and disposal costs, influences the production decisions of both the innovating and the rival firms. The sign of the impact depends on the firms’ strategy in the product market. Furthermore, the analysis points out that cooperation in R&D of firms competing in the product market reinforces incentives to invest in green innovation. This suggests that governments aimed to advance a Circular Economy should encourage firms’ cooperation.

Keywords: circular economy; cournot oligopoly; R&D investment spillovers; green innovation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/12/3/68/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/12/3/68/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jgames:v:12:y:2021:i:3:p:68-:d:636545

Access Statistics for this article

Games is currently edited by Ms. Susie Huang

More articles in Games from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().