Screening Teams of Moral and Altruistic Agents

Roberto Sarkisian
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Roberto Sarkisian: Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome Tor Vergata, 00133 Rome, Italy

Games, 2021, vol. 12, issue 4, 1-11

Abstract: This paper studies the problem of screening teams of either moral or altruistic agents, in a setting where agents choose whether or not to exert effort in order to achieve a high output for the principal. I show that there exists no separating equilibrium menu of contracts that induces the agents to reveal their types unless the principal either (i) excludes one group from the productive relationship, or (ii) demands different efforts from different preference groups. I also characterize the contract-inducing pooling equilibria in which all agents are incentivized to exert a high level of effort.

Keywords: screening; homo moralis; altruism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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