The Hybridisation of Conflict: A Prospect Theoretic Analysis

Pieter Balcaen, Cind Du Bois and Caroline Buts
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Pieter Balcaen: Department of Economics, Management and Leadership, Royal Military Academy, 1000 Brussels, Belgium
Cind Du Bois: Department of Economics, Management and Leadership, Royal Military Academy, 1000 Brussels, Belgium
Caroline Buts: Department of Applied Economics, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 1000 Brussels, Belgium

Games, 2021, vol. 12, issue 4, 1-15

Abstract: Revisionist actors are increasingly operationalising a broad number of non-violent threats in their quest to change the status quo, popularly described as hybrid conflict. From a defensive point of view, this proliferation of threats compels nations to make difficult choices in terms of force posture and composition. We examine the choice process associated with this contemporary form of state competition by modelling the interactions between two actors, i.e., a defender and a challenger. As these choices are characterised by a high degree of uncertainty, we study the choice from the framework of prospect theory. This behavioural–economic perspective indicates that the defender will give a higher weight and a higher subjective value to conventional threats, inducing a higher vulnerability in the domain of hybrid deterrence. As future conflict will increasingly involve choice dilemmas, we must balance threats according to their probability of occurrence and their consequences. This article raises awareness regarding our cognitive biases when making these choices.

Keywords: hybrid threats; state competition; prospect theory; grand strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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