An Experiment on Cooperation in a CPR Game with a Disapproval Option

Koffi Serge William Yao
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Koffi Serge William Yao: CEE-M, CNRS, INRAE, 34960 Montpellier, France

Games, 2021, vol. 12, issue 4, 1-14

Abstract: This paper studies the standard version of the approval mechanism with two players in a common pool resource (CPR) extraction game. In the case of disapproval, the Nash extraction level is implemented. The paper investigates, experimentally, the extent to which the Nash threat leads to Pareto-improving extraction levels. Through our experiment, we confirm the effectiveness of the Nash threat in reducing CPR over-extraction. Although participants’ behavior is mainly explained by rational thinking, inequity in payoff can also motivate their behavior. Moreover, we show that there is neither an order effect nor a framing effect. Finally, the reduction persists when the Nash threat is no longer in place.

Keywords: laboratory group behavior; common pool resource; approval mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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