A Bargaining Game with Proposers in the Hot Seat

Bram Driesen
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Bram Driesen: Department Academic Affairs, Open University, Valkenburgerweg 177, 6419 AT Heerlen, The Netherlands

Games, 2021, vol. 12, issue 4, 1-8

Abstract: This note reconsiders the Rubinstein bargaining game under the assumption that a rejected offer is only costly to the proposer who made the rejected offer. It is shown that then, the classic result of Shaked that, in the multilateral version of this game, every division of the good can be sustained in SPE no longer holds. Specifically, there are many SPE, but players’ (expected) payoffs in SPE are unique. The assumption further leads to a responder advantage.

Keywords: multilateral; bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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