Gender and Nominal Power in Multilateral Bargaining

Nicola Maaser, Fabian Paetzel and Stefan Traub
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Nicola Maaser: Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, 8210 Aarhus, Denmark
Stefan Traub: Department of Economics & FOR 2104, Helmut-Schmidt University Hamburg, 22043 Hamburg, Germany

Games, 2022, vol. 13, issue 1, 1-25

Abstract: In many bargaining situations, the distribution of seats or voting weights does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Maaser, Paetzel and Traub (Games and Economic Behavior, 2019) conducted an experiment to investigate the effect of such nominal power differences in the classic Baron–Ferejohn model. This paper re-analyzes the data from that experiment, looking at gender differences in bargaining behavior and in the effect of nominal weights. We find that women and men differ in particular with respect to the proposed distribution of payoffs and coalition size. By contrast, nominal weights have only minor gender-specific effects.

Keywords: bargaining; gender differences; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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