Egalitarian Allocations and Convexity

Irinel C. Dragan
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Irinel C. Dragan: Department of Mathematics, University of Texas, Arlington, TX 76019-0408, USA

Games, 2022, vol. 13, issue 2, 1-4

Abstract: In the Inverse Set, relative to the Shapley Value of a non-convex cooperative game, we derive a procedure to find out a convex game in which the Egalitarian Allocation is a coalitional rational value. The procedure depends on the relationship between two parameters called the Convexity Threshold and the Coalitional Rationality Threshold. Some examples follow and illustrate the procedure. We discussed a similar problem for other efficient values, the Shapley Value and the Egalitarian Nonseparable Contribution, in earlier work.

Keywords: inverse set; convex game; convexity threshold; coalitional rationality threshold (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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