Second-Price Auctions with Private Entry Costs

Todd Kaplan and Aner Sela

Games, 2022, vol. 13, issue 5, 1-14

Abstract: We study asymmetric second-price auctions under incomplete information. The bidders have two potentially different, commonly known, valuations for the object and private information about their entry costs. The seller, however, does not benefit from these entry costs. We calculate the equilibrium strategies of the bidders and analyze the optimal design for the seller in this environment in terms of expected entry and the number of potential bidders.

Keywords: asymmetric auctions; entry costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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