Groundwater Usage and Strategic Complements: Part II (Revealed Preferences)

Caleb M. Koch and Heinrich H. Nax ()
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Caleb M. Koch: Computational Social Science, Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences, ETH Zürich, 8050 Zürich, Switzerland
Heinrich H. Nax: Behavioral Game Theory, Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences, ETH Zürich, 8050 Zürich, Switzerland

Games, 2022, vol. 13, issue 5, 1-19

Abstract: We investigate the strategic nature of farmers’ groundwater usage with a rich dataset from the American Midwest. We propose a new revealed preference test for the groundwater interaction as a dynamic game. We reject a view of groundwater usage decisions as strategic substitutes in favor of strategic complements as a better description.

Keywords: groundwater; dynamic game theory; revealed preferences; strategic complements; strategic substitutes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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